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Since the 2006 election, the minority Conservative government, led by Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, has come under intense scrutiny for two reforms to the 
process of appointing judges. First, in making a Supreme Court appointment, the 
Conservatives held an innovative and highly publicized hearing that allowed an ad 
hoc parliamentary committee to interview the government’s nominee, Justice 
Marshall Rothstein, before his official appointment. Second, they reformed the 
Judicial Advisory Committees (JACs) that screen the pool of candidates for all other 
federal judicial appointments into more and less qualified categories. I focus in this 
essay on the controversy generated by the JAC reforms. Rather than dealing with 
questions of institutional design—e.g. the relative merits of screening and 
nominating committees—I analyze the rhetorical reception of the JAC reforms. 
While defenders maintained that the reforms were relatively minor adjustments to 
the system, critics blasted them as a startling departure from the “merit principle” in 
judicial selection in favour of a dangerous ideological politicization of the judiciaiy. 
The minimalist defence of the reforms was wrong; they did represent significant 
departures from the JAC tradition. At the same time, the critique was more than a 
little overheated. Indeed, its exaggerations can be understood as the latest episode in 
the long-standing partisan demonization of the Harper Conservatives as anti-Charter 
and anti-court.
T h e  JAC R e f o r m s
Since the initial JACs in 1988, the committee members, all appointed by the federal 
Minister of Justice, have fallen into two categories: 1) a minority of discretionary 
ministerial appointments, and 2) a majority of nominated appointments, chosen by 
the minister from lists proposed by other constituencies.1 The size of committees 
went from five to seven members in 1994, with three discretionary and four 
nominated appointments:
• a nominee of the provincial or territorial law society; a nominee of the 
provincial or territorial branch of the Canadian Bar Association;
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• a judge nominated by the Chief Justice or senior judge of the province or 
territory;
• a nominee of the provincial Attorney-General or territorial Minister of 
Justice.
The judicial representative, who was a full voting member, chaired the JAC. In 
1988, JACs screened candidates into two categories: qualified and unqualified. In 
1991, this was changed to a threefold distinction: not recommended, recommended, 
and highly recommended.
The Harper Conservatives made three main changes to this system:
• They added a representative of the law enforcement community to the list of 
nominated appointments.
• They limited the voting power of the judicial chair to breaking ties.
• They scrapped the threefold categorization, which distinguished among 
qualified candidates, and returned to the original twofold distinction 
between qualified and unqualified.
These reforms attracted considerable public comment and criticism. Indeed, it 
is instructive to compare the public attention generated by Harper’s reforms with the 
1994 Liberal government’s expansion of JACs, which also included appointments 
for “diversity” reasons, though the particular kind of diversity was not as clearly 
specified as Harper’s “law enforcement” appointments. Of the 277 news items turned 
up by a search of ProQuest databases using the term “judicial advisory committee,” 
only 44 were written prior to the 2006 election of the Harper government, and only 
two of those—both relatively neutral—were about the 1994 reforms to JACs. The 
other 243 items all came after Harper’s election and concentrated on his JAC 
reforms.2 Prominent among the critics of the Harper reforms were the Canadian 
Judicial Council, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, and former Chief Justice 
Antonio Lamer. The ProQuest search turned up no such high-level commentary from 
the legal community about the 1994 reforms.
What accounts for this startling imbalance? There are two possibilities. First, 
that the Harper reforms were, as the critics claimed, startling innovations that 
substituted blatantly political criteria for the “merit principle” in judicial selection— 
in short, that the reforms politicized judicial appointments in unacceptable ways. 
Second, that the critique was a highly partisan exaggeration, consistent with a 
longstanding demonization of the Conservatives as anti-Charter and anti-court. I 
maintain that, while there is some truth in the politicization charge, it is much 
overplayed and rests on a misleading use of the term “merit”. The over-dramatized
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opposition between an apolitical judicial “merit” and corrupt political calculation is 
itself part of a broader phenomenon of rhetorical demonization.
M e r it  v s . P o l it ic s : A n  E x a g g e r a t e d  D is t in c t io n
Although the Conservatives sometimes defended their reforms as simple adjustments 
within the JAC tradition, they differed from previous reforms in important ways. 
Critics have highlighted three in particular:
• The reforms were not undertaken in consultation with the legal community. 
Such consultation had played an important role in establishing JACs in the 
first place and had been part of all subsequent reforms.
• The screening categories were reduced from three to two. While this could 
be characterized as a “return” to the original 1988 situation rather than a 
startling departure, it nevertheless moved away from criteria that were put 
in place very early in the history of JACs, and was criticized as rendering 
JACs “virtually useless”.3
• The combined effect of the new “law enforcement” representative and the 
reduced voting power of the judicial chair shifted the balance of power on 
JACs. This change was often misrepresented as tipping the balance in 
favour of discretionary ministerial appointments. The Canadian Judicial 
Council (CJC), for example, treated the “law enforcement” representative as 
a fourth discretionary ministerial appointment, meaning that of the “seven 
members who are ordinarily entitled to vote” (given the reduced voting 
power of the judicial chair), four are “chosen by the Minister of Justice”. 
With “the majority of voting members now appointed by the Minister,” 
argued the CJC, “the advisory committees may neither be, nor be seen to be, 
fully independent of the government.”4 In fact, however, the “law 
enforcement” representative is a fifth nominated appointment, not a fourth 
discretionary appointment. Nominated appointments thus retain the 
majority, even with the reduced voting power of the judicial chair. The 
Harper government’s reforms did not tip the balance in favour of 
discretionary ministerial appointments. They clearly did, however, shift the 
balance of power between lawyers (including judges) and non-lawyers on 
JACs, and this appears to have been the real objection.
For the critics, the reforms moved away from a judicial screening process with 
some reasonable independence from political control to one more subject to political 
influence and discretion. The ultimate discretion to choose was always a purely 
political one, of course, but in practice only “recommended” or “highly
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recommended” candidates were appointed. Under the Harper government’s reforms, 
politicians would still choose from the overall pool of qualified candidates but would 
no longer have to contend with the embarrassment of choosing a merely “qualified” 
candidate over a “highly qualified” one. Moreover, in assigning candidates to the 
qualified and unqualified categories, non-lawyers on the JACs (including law-and- 
order cops) might prevail over the more expert representatives of the legal 
community. The result, according to the critics, would be an unhealthy politicization 
of appointments that would dilute the principle of “merit” in judicial selection. Had 
the government only followed the tradition of consulting with the legal community, 
this blatant error in judgment might not have happened (which, of course, is 
precisely why the consultation never happened).
At this point, one must distinguish between two kinds of politicization. First is 
run-of-the-mill patronage—the appointment of one’s political friends. This hallmark 
of federal judicial appointments survived the introduction of the JAC screening 
system quite nicely, with both major national parties continuing its practice when in 
power. This kind of traditional patronage was not, however, the primary basis on 
which the reforms were criticized. In portraying the reforms as diluting the 
commitment to “merit” as the basis for judicial appointment, the critics were 
necessarily saying that the existing process, despite being patronage ridden, was 
more oriented to merit. The new, and egregious, attack on “merit” came, for the 
critics, from a second kind of politicization: ideological politicization. The 
appointment of political friends was one thing; the appointment of policy ideologues 
was quite another. The Harper government, charged the critics, was preparing to 
stack the courts with social conservatives who would subvert Charter values. It was 
moving its “hidden agenda” into Canadian courtrooms.
In fact, the Conservatives did very little to hide this agenda, at least as far as 
law-and-order issues were concerned. Emphasizing his government’s desire to 
“crack down on crime” and to “make our streets and communities safer”, Harper 
wanted to ensure that the “selection of judges is in correspondence with those 
objectives.”5 Policy-oriented appointment was explicitly the name of the game. For 
the critics, it was this kind of ideological appointment that was especially 
objectionable, introducing an openly political bias that was highly corrosive of the 
merit principle in judicial appointments. But the distinction between apolitical merit 
and political judgment is not nearly as clean and clear as the rhetoric implies.
We can gain further insight into the concept of “judicial merit” at work here by 
considering the critics’ claim that bringing policy considerations openly into the 
appointment process undermines the principles of judicial independence and 
impartiality on which our constitutional system rests. By judicial independence, the 
critics obviously have in mind more than the traditional security of salary, tenure, 
and administrative control that have long characterized our tradition and that remain 
unaffected by the Harper government’s JAC reforms.6 These traditional protections
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of judicial independence enable judges to be impartial between the parties before 
them. But, again, when they invoke “impartiality”, critics of the Harper reforms have 
in mind much more than impartiality between parties. They also want impartiality on 
the issues of legal policymaking that must sometimes be determined to resolve the 
case between the parties. These are two different kinds of impartiality. As a case 
climbs the appellate hierarchy, the significance of the parties and impartiality 
between them tends to fall away, with the emphasis clearly shifting to legal 
policymaking. Indeed, at the highest levels it is not uncommon for judges to decide 
issues of legal policy not raised by the factual situation of the parties or to adopt 
policy solutions recommended by intervenors and of little interest to the parties. It is 
on such matters of legal policymaking that the critics want judges to be “impartial”. 
The capacity to be impartial in this way on policy questions is part of the “judicial 
merit” that they believe judicial selection should emphasize and that the 
Conservative reforms de-emphasize.
But what can it mean to be impartial about the highly discretionary matters of 
reasonable disagreement that are typically the object of judicial policymaking? If one 
accepts—as a great many do—that the issues resolved by judges under entrenched 
constitutional instruments are indeed matters of reasonable disagreement, the idea of 
a kind of “merit” that somehow rises above the fray to sit in objective judgment on 
those engaged in legitimate disagreement becomes problematic. Indeed, in a 
democratic context, one might even begin to see some “merit” in the attempt by 
those who prevail in the clash of reasonable alternatives to ensure that their victory is 
not overturned by a few unelected officials taking the other side.
But perhaps, there is a way of rescuing the notion of “impartiality” in the face 
of “reasonable disagreements”. Suppose one holds—as I do—that to describe 
something as a matter of reasonable disagreement is not necessarily to deny the 
possibility of a right answer. It is, rather, simply to acknowledge that even (what one 
considers to be) an objectively “wrong” answer can find support among people of 
good will and might be reasonably chosen by the democratic process. If this is true, 
might one not contend that the hurly-burly of the partisan politics within the political 
branches is less likely to produce the right answer—even in matters of reasonable 
disagreement—than the more dispassionate arena of the courtroom? True, no one 
realistically expects judges to be blank slates, without inclinations or pre-conceived 
views on issues that come before them, but, like students in a seminar, one might 
expect them to be more open to rational persuasion than partisan politicians are. Let 
me concede the point for the sake of argument (though I doubt it would survive fuller 
examination). What do we gain? Only this: that the judgment of the judicial seminar 
must trump the democratic judgment on matters of reasonable disagreement because 
the judicial institution is more likely to choose the right—or at least better—side in a 
legitimate debate among people of good will. If one thinks this through, I believe, it 
is a fundamental rejection of democracy in favour of the rule of “philosopher kings.” 
If that is indeed the proper criterion of judgment, the Harper Conservatives can 
legitimately be criticized for moving in the wrong direction with their JAC reforms. 
If not, the vilification of their attack on judicial merit might well be seen as just a tad 
overwrought.
Now, I do not claim to have settled the debate about judicial merit and 
politicization. The theoretical issues are too complex to be fully captured by my brief 
commentary. In addition, important questions can be raised about the effectiveness 
of ideological appointments, even if one regards them as justified in principle. One 
might, for example, wonder about the ideological reliability over time of judges 
appointed for their policy views, especially because, once appointed, judges really do 
enjoy considerable “independence”. Nor can one discount the effect, again over time, 
of their integration into the existing judicial culture, which surely shapes them as 
much as they shape it. It must also be recognized that what is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander, and that when the Liberals regain power, they can be expected 
to similarly bring their own inevitable political calculations into the open. Perhaps, as 
Troy Riddell has argued, it would have been better for Harper to address his law- 
and-order-policy preferences not through judicial appointments, but through 
legislative changes to, say, sentencing issues.7 But, of course, this neglects the ability 
of judges to sit in second judgment on such initiatives as mandatory minimum 
sentences. While I have not settled the matter, however, I hope at least to have shown 
that the claims of egregious villainy by the Harper Conservatives are not as starkly 
obvious as many of the critics suggest. The intensity of the critique, in other words, 
was a kind of exaggeration. The exaggerated rhetoric fits into, and is explained by, a 
pre-existing context of demonization of the Conservatives on judicial matters.
T h e  D e m o n iz a t io n  C o n t e x t
Demonization of the Harper Conservatives as anti-Charter and anti-court has 
become a staple in the last several federal election campaigns, as well as in the 
partisan maneuvering between elections. The term “demonization”, which I choose 
advisedly, suggests an exaggerated or inflationary level of rhetoric. This 
exaggeration is revealed by the fact that critics of the Conservatives on Charter and 
judicial issues often vilify—that is not too strong a word—positions they themselves 
once held. Jean Chrétien, for example, had, during the period of Charter-making, 
insisted that the s. 33 notwithstanding clause be made available to the federal 
government as well as the provinces, and he later defended s. 33 against Brian 
Mulroney’s charge that it made the Charter “not worth the paper it’s written on.”8 
When his partisan opponents defended s. 33 during the 2000 election, however, 
Chrétien presented the section as appealing to “the dark side of people” and as a 
“nuclear bomb” that would “destroy the Charter o f Rights.”9 Similarly, although 
Paul Martin had defended the use of s. 33 prior to the 2004 election, specifying 
circumstances under which he “would use it”, during the election he reacted to 
Harper’s very similar statements about s. 33 by completely rejecting the legitimacy 
of the clause. “My refusal to use the notwithstanding clause,” he said, “is a very clear
7 Ibid.
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indication of the depth of the gulf between Mr. Harper and myself.”10 In the 2006 
election, Martin went so far as to propose removing the notwithstanding clause in 
order “to protect the Charter against a prime minister [i.e., Stephen Harper] who 
might want to use the notwithstanding clause to attack minority rights”.11
During the electorally charged period of the Martin minority government, 134 
law professors entered the partisan fray by insisting that, were Harper to become 
Prime Minister, he could “honestly” enact the traditional heterosexual definition of 
marriage only by including a “notwithstanding clause” even though the Supreme 
Court in the same-sex marriage reference had explicitly refused to address the 
constitutionality of the heterosexual definition.12 Those among the 134 who were on 
record as opposing the very kind of “prospective” use of s. 33 they were now 
insisting on were no more embarrassed by their self-contradiction than Chrétien or 
Martin had been about theirs.13
Similar about-faces were necessary to demonize the Harper Conservatives on 
the substantive Charter issues. The fact that Chrétien and Martin had voted with the 
huge majority of MPs who supported a 1999 parliamentary resolution in favour of 
keeping the heterosexual definition of marriage did not prevent them from later 
presenting the same position as evidence of the Conservatives social extremism 
(even though the latter supported the kinds of compromise civil unions in place in 
many other liberal democracies). Or consider Conservative MP Rob Merrifield’s 
comment during the 2004 election that it might be useful for women contemplating 
an abortion to take some counselling first. The fact that Paul Martin has said the 
same thing earlier in the campaign did not prevent the Liberals from seeing in 
Merrifield’s comments a “profoundly disturbing” and “very frightening hidden 
agenda” on social issues.14
The examples could easily be multiplied, but the point is clear. In the heat of 
partisan politics, the Conservatives have regularly been demonized as anti -Charter 
and anti-court for taking positions the demonizers themselves have subscribed to in 
other contexts. The Liberals consistently insist that they are the party of the Charter 
and Charter values while their Conservative opponents are anti-Canadian opponents 
of these values. Even scholars with some conservative inclinations have described 
the Liberals as the Charter party and the Conservatives as the BNA Act party.15
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This highly charged and inflammatory partisan context—one that has clearly 
embroiled intellectuals as well as politicians—cannot be ignored in assessing the 
public controversy that swirled around the Conservative JAC reforms. One cannot 
prove counterfactuals, of course, but it is worth asking what the reaction might have 
been had very similar reforms been enacted by a Liberal government. It is surely 
plausible to think that they would have garnered more attention—and more 
criticism!—than the 1994 Liberal reforms, but that the level of criticism would not 
have been as high or intense as in the case of the Conservative reforms. Given the 
ongoing “demonization context” in which the Harper government launched its 
reforms, it is difficult to deny that the reaction was influenced not only by “what” 
was done but also by “who” was doing it.
C onclusion
Have we arrived at the best system of federal judicial appointments? That is not my 
claim. I have tried merely to identify the ways in which the reforms have been 
demonized out of all proportion. Whatever their weaknesses, the Harper reforms will 
not be the unmitigated disaster that some critics foresee. On this point, I give the last 
word to Marshall Crowe. Crowe, who served on a JAC, responded to a claim that 
going from three screening categories—not recommended, recommended, and highly 
recommended—back to two made the JACs worse than useless because “to be 
simply “recommended”, a candidate had only to meet the most minimal 
requirements.” By implication, only the “highly recommended” candidates were 
truly worthy. Crowe disagreed. If it were true that only “the most minimal 
requirements” were necessary to make it into the recommended category, “[t]hat 
would mean recommending virtually every applicant,” when “[i]n fact, we 
recommended only between a third and 50 per cent of all applicants.” For Crowe, in 
short, the bar between qualified and unqualified was reasonably high. True, “the 
small number of “highly recommended” individuals were almost all appointed,” but 
the other appointees also met reasonable standards because none of them, in Crowe’s 
memory, came from the 50 to 70 per cent of candidates screened out as unqualified. 
Crowe concludes that:
Criticism of the government’s moderate proposals is exaggerated. I see no 
reason to expect the high legal quality of recommended candidates to 
diminish: The government will still have ample scope to make choices 
among those recommended. Given the unqualified constitutional authority 
of the executive over judicial appointments, that is how it should be.16
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